Investing in Early Intervention Initiatives

EIIF outcomes reporting 

Each year, DTF produces a consolidated outcomes report for all EIIF initiatives. This gives the government useful information on initiatives' performance and service user outcomes. 

DTF’s 2024–25 outcomes report includes initiatives’: 

• outcome measure results
• performance against targets
• trend information where there is more than one year of data.

A goal of the EIIF is to improve outcomes for Victorians. Where initiatives have outcome measures with targets and results, reporting can show if outcomes are improving over time.

For example, the 2024–25 outcomes report includes case studies of initiatives meeting targets linked to service user outcomes, such as improved school engagement for young people in contact with youth justice, and improved parenting capacity for participating families.

The 2024–25 outcomes report sets out how DTF assesses performance, using ‘met’, ‘partially met’, ‘not met’ and ‘not applicable’ categories. In 2024–25, our audited departments reported targets and results for 214 of 429 outcome measures (49.9 per cent). Of these measures, departments met the targets for 84.6 per cent.

DTF’s annual outcomes reports also show underperformance or where evidence is incomplete, including:

• initiatives that are not yet reporting results
• incomplete outcome measures or targets 
• outcome measures aligned with savings that partially met or did not meet their targets
• where further data or evaluation is needed to confirm impacts. 

The reports also explain why data is not available, and note that ongoing non reporting limits the ability to assess whether expected impacts are being achieved.

Measuring service demand 

The EIIF aims to reduce demand for government services over time. To assess this, DTF and departments need to track changes in demand for the services where savings are expected. 

Departments develop outcome measures for their EIIF initiatives. But they do not consistently have, or report on, measures that capture changes in service demand (known as ’savings outcome measures’). This is important because changes in service demand underpin estimated savings. 

In 2024–25, most of our audited departments' initiatives had savings outcome measures, but reporting was uneven. Of the 57 initiatives required to report against their outcome measures:

• 47 (82.5 per cent) had at least one savings outcome measure
• 10 (17.5 per cent) had no savings outcome measures, despite having $106.9 million in estimated savings
• 13 (22.8 per cent) had savings outcome measures but no results, despite having $312.8 million in estimated savings
• 11 (19.3 per cent) had only one savings outcome measure (which may be appropriate where savings are low, easily reflected by one measure, or attributed to a single department).

Where savings outcome measures and results are available, they provide useful information about changes in service demand. But where they are missing or not reported, outcomes reporting does not clearly show if service demand is reducing in the services where savings are expected. 

For example, the DFFH initiative ‘Investing early where it matters’ has $27.14 million in estimated savings. But DFFH does not report savings outcome measures that directly track if demand has decreased for services where those savings are expected to occur. It instead reports on proxy measures for service use.

DTF told us it is not aware of instances where a lack of savings outcome measures has led to inappropriate budget reductions. But without measures and results, departments and DTF cannot consistently assess if service demand is reducing in line with estimated savings.

Guidance on measuring changes in service demand

DTF guidance says departments should use savings outcome measures to understand changes in demand. But it does not clearly explain how departments should track changes in service demand or set minimum expectations for what should be measured or reported.

DTF guidance has changed over time. Until 2026–27, it required departments to have at least one savings outcome measure. But not all funded initiatives had this. DTF removed this requirement from its 2026–27 guidance.

Instead, DTF’s 2026–27 guidance encourages departments to develop a set of outcome measures that capture service use patterns and directly track large, system-wide savings (for example, savings of more than $20 million). But this is not mandatory. This reduces consistency in how departments measure and report reductions in service demand.

Departments are responsible for developing and reporting outcome measures. DTF assesses their suitability and uses this information to create its advice to the government.

Without consistent expectations for measuring changes in service demand, there is a risk that evidence of reduced service demand is incomplete or uneven across initiatives.

Initiatives with low savings

Some initiatives without savings outcome measures have low estimated savings or expect savings beyond the 10 year modelling period. 

DTF told us that savings outcome measures may not add value in these cases. This is because they are unlikely to produce meaningful evidence of reduced service demand or savings, relative to the effort required to develop and track them. 

For the initiatives audited departments had to report against in 2024–25, the average savings for initiatives without savings outcome measures was $10.7 million, compared to $25.2 million for all initiatives. 

DTF guidance does not clearly say when savings outcome measures are not required, including based on the size or timing of expected savings.

DTF's advice to the government also does not clearly explain where departments have not used savings outcome measures because they are considered low value.

This means there is no consistent basis for the government to distinguish between initiatives where having limited outcome measures is proportionate to expected savings, and initiatives where it reflects evidence gaps.

Even where expected savings are relatively small, they can become material over time because budget reductions are ongoing. This information is also important for assessing whether initiatives should be continued or extended.

Clearer guidance would allow the government to assess if the level of evidence supporting reduced service demand is appropriate across all initiatives.

Calculating actual savings 

The government reduces departments' budgets based on initiatives’ estimated cost savings. This means DTF and departments need to show if and how changes in service demand lead to actual savings over time. 

The EIIF funding model relies on estimated savings to support both budget reductions and future investment in early intervention (through the EIIF contingency). There needs to be a clear, consistent approach to calculate whether these savings are being achieved over time.

But DTF and departments do not routinely calculate actual savings. DTF does not require departments to do so and it does not provide a framework to help them do this.

DTF said calculating actual savings for all initiatives is not necessary or efficient, particularly for lower-value or early-stage EIIF initiatives where savings are modest or performance information suggests initiatives are delivering their expected outcomes.

DTF instead uses a risk-based approach to monitor initiatives’ performance through its annual outcomes report. 

If it finds risks, it may do detailed analysis and consider if budget reductions are worth exploring with departments. For example, the 2024–25 outcomes report identified 11 higher-risk initiatives across 4 departments with savings outcome measures that only partially met or did not meet their targets. DTF identified these for closer monitoring. 

DTF also uses outcomes report data to update its savings modelling for some initiatives.

But there is not a routine process to verify actual savings for individual initiatives or assess the overall savings achieved by the EIIF. 

Even where initiatives are mature or expected savings are material, there is no clear process to:

• measure how much service demand has reduced
• apply unit costs to those reductions
• report the dollar value of actual savings achieved.

This limits the government's ability to assess if the estimated savings supporting ongoing budget reductions are being achieved. 

Challenges to calculating actual savings

There are genuine challenges to calculating actual savings. Departments told us these include:

• limited data and comparison groups
• overlapping EIIF initiatives affecting the same services
• changing participant groups
• changes in unit costs over time
• no shared, cross government method for calculating savings
• limited capacity to assess changes in service demand.

Calculating actual savings can be even harder for initiatives that are funded through the EIIF but were running before being included in the EIIF. 

For example, DFFH told us that:

• some of its initiatives already affected service demand before it received EIIF funding, which makes it hard to isolate impacts from existing service delivery
• it cannot always establish a control group or baseline, or predict who will participate in its initiatives, which limits its ability to track changes in service demand and calculate savings.

Together, these challenges can make it difficult to isolate initiatives’ impacts and translate changes in service demand into savings. 

DTF does not provide departments with detailed guidance or minimum standards to help them manage these challenges or explain uncertainty when reporting savings evidence.

Budget reductions based on estimates

Because there is no systemic process to calculate actual savings, budget reductions under the EIIF continue to be based on estimates. 

When departments apply for EIIF funding, they estimate the savings they expect to see from less service demand over 10 years. DTF uses these estimates to calculate budget reductions. 

Once applied, departments’ budgets are reduced every year with no end date.

The government has reduced department budgets by $162.9 million through the EIIF between 2021–22 and 2025–26, as Figure 3 shows. It will reduce budgets by a further $441.3 million by 2029–30, even though total budgets may increase over time.

Figure 3: EIIF funding, expected savings, contingency and budget reductions by department

Note: DJCS includes funding, savings, contingency and budget reductions attributed to Court Services Victoria and Victoria Police. ‘Other’ refers to departments that have received smaller amounts of funding through the EIIF, including the Department of Government Services (DGS), Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC), Department of Jobs, Skills, Industry and Regions (DJSIR), and Department of Transport and Planning (DTP). We calculated the expected savings using department contingency allocated in each budget. Some totals do not add due to rounding. Totals for expected savings and contingency allocated in other parts of this report may differ from Figure 3 due to general contingency, rounding, adjustments, changing savings assumptions and shifting funding across budget years.
Source: VAGO, based on information from DTF.

Initiatives funded between 2021–22 and 2025–26 will reduce departments’ budgets by $114.5 million each year from 2027–28. As the government funds new EIIF initiatives, this figure will increase.

Budget reductions applied to other entities

Many EIIF budget reductions apply to departments that cannot control or verify outcomes. This happens when an initiative is expected to reduce service demand in another department's services. 

DTF’s internal guidance says these cases need closer review of modelling, which informs its advice to the government on estimated savings. 

In 2025–26, the government funded 32 EIIF initiatives. These initiatives will result in annual budget reductions of $16.9 million from 2027–28. More than half (54.9 per cent) of these reductions apply to entities that did not design or deliver the initiatives. 

For example:

• all funding reductions applied to Court Services Victoria come from other departments' initiatives 
• most funding reductions applied to Victoria Police (94.5 per cent) and DJCS (72.2 per cent) come from other departments' initiatives
• more than one-third of funding reductions applied to DH and DFFH (36.3 per cent and 34.0 per cent, respectively) come from other departments’ initiatives.

These entities have limited ability to influence outcomes because they are not delivering the initiatives that have led to their budget reductions. 

Outcome measures do not always track the savings applied to other entities’ budgets. Even where they do, DTF and departments do not routinely use them to calculate actual savings, limiting their ability to verify if savings have occurred.

This weakens accountability for the EIIF’s outcomes and increases the risk that budget reductions apply without evidence that service demand has reduced.

Managing uncertainty

DTF has acknowledged the risk that budget reductions may apply before savings are realised or where savings do not fully materialise. 

DTF has processes in place to manage this risk. It:

• delays budget reductions until year 3 of the initiative to allow time for benefits to emerge
• applies annual budget reductions at 5 per cent of the initiative’s 10-year estimated savings.

These processes help reduce the risk of inappropriate budget impacts, particularly in the early years of initiatives.

In 2025, the Treasurer invited ministers to request adjustments to their departments’ budget reductions where initiatives are not meeting at least 50 per cent of their expected outcomes. This provides a formal mechanism to reassess budget reductions, which relies on departments and ministers making requests and providing supporting evidence. 

To date, DTF has received no requests for budget reduction changes. Departments said limited capacity and complexity can make this difficult. 

In one case, a department sought budget changes for initiatives delivered by other departments, but DTF told it only the responsible department could request changes through its Minister. No changes occurred. DTF told us it did not follow up with the responsible department as it is awaiting information from the 2025–26 outcomes report.

Risk of ongoing budget reductions without evidence

These processes have not led to routine reassessment of budget reductions based on measured changes in service demand or actual calculated savings.

As at April 2026, 4 years after EIIF reporting began, DTF has not recommended any changes to budget reductions based on evidence of reduced service demand or actual savings. This means budget reductions continue to apply based on estimated savings. DTF said that:

• more time is needed (at least 3 years of outcomes data) to assess performance trends
• it has not seen evidence of underperformance that would require calculating actual savings
• any underperformance is within the 50 per cent buffer used in its estimated savings modelling.

But because DTF does not require departments to measure reduced service demand or calculate actual savings, there is limited evidence available to support reassessment of budget reductions.

Where DTF has changed budget reductions, the changes reflect individual delivery issues or updates to estimated savings modelling, not a calculation of actual savings. This includes:

• in 2024–25, DTF adjusted budget reductions after DFFH partly delivered an EIIF initiative and redirected funding to another initiative 
• for 2026–27, DTF adjusted budget reductions for an initiative after its estimated savings modelling was revised, and adjusted the timing of budget reductions for another initiative.

If this practice continues as the EIIF progresses, budget reductions may continue without clear evidence across the framework that service demand and costs have reduced as estimated. 

This could place ongoing budget pressure on departments if savings are not achieved and cannot be verified. 

How DTF assesses submissions and advises the government 

DTF has a consistent process to assess EIIF submissions and advise the government, which it has refined over successive Budgets.

Its process includes: 

• assessing outcome measures against initiatives’ intended impacts, evidence and targets
• reviewing initiatives’ estimated savings
• comparing initiatives based on their expected outcomes and estimated returns on investment.

DTF uses this information to give advice to the government.

DTF advice includes the use of the EIIF contingency, alongside standard budget funding. DTF provides clear advice each year on how the EIIF contingency affects departmental budgets. 

The government has approved $1.02 billion in EIIF contingency to fund new EIIF initiatives. This supports the EIIF’s aim of shifting investment towards early intervention through an ongoing reinvestment cycle.

DTF monitors initiatives’ performance through annual outcomes reporting. It uses this information to create its advice to the government about new or expanded initiatives.

This shows a consistent approach to assessment, with a focus on continuous improvement and strengthening evidence, measurement and reporting over time.

Issues with DTF’s outcomes assessment

Despite its consistent approach, some aspects of DTF’s assessment process mean that initiatives can score well against the criteria even when key elements are missing. 

DTF rates departments’ proposed outcome measures using a zero to 3 scoring scale. Outcome measures above 2.2 are rated as ’high’, which means the initiative is prioritised in funding recommendations. 

In its guidance, DTF says initiatives must have outcome measures that show expected savings and have baselines and targets. 

But DTF’s assessment scale treats these as weighted factors, not as minimum requirements. This means initiatives can receive high ratings without meeting the EIIF’s requirements. 

As a result, an initiative can score highly on DTF’s outcomes assessment without fully showing how it will measure its impact on service users and demand over time.

Initiatives where funding is higher than savings

DTF has recommended some initiatives where the estimated 10-year savings are lower than the recommended funding. 

In 2025–26, DTF gave estimated return on investment information to the government for 23 initiative components (which are sub-parts of initiatives). Of these, 11 components (47.8 per cent) had a return on investment below one, which means 10-year savings are lower than funding levels. 

When we applied the same approach to DTF's 2024–25 estimated return on investment information provided to the government, we found 18 of 27 initiatives (66.7 per cent) had a return on investment below one.

DTF told us the government has not set a minimum return on investment or estimated savings threshold for EIIF initiatives. It said its funding recommendations can consider broader factors such as policy merit, system reform benefits or budget capacity. This reflects that some EIIF initiatives are expected to deliver benefits beyond direct cost savings.

DTF assesses initiatives using expected outcomes and estimated return on investment. It ranks submissions based on their relative impact and broader policy considerations as part of its advice to the government. DTF also publishes funding and estimated savings publicly in Budget papers. 

These practices support transparency about EIIF initiatives’ expected benefits. But where estimated savings are lower than funding, it is not always clear how these initiatives contribute to the EIIF's goal of reducing long-term spending through lower demand.

Clearer articulation of how DTF weighs broader benefits against lower estimated savings would help the government understand how funding recommendations align with the EIIF’s objectives.

Advice about initiative risk and uncertainty

We reviewed 16 initiatives sent to DTF for assessment between 2023–24 and 2025–26. DTF advised the government on estimated savings in 11 cases and outcome measures in 10 cases.

Where DTF advised the government, it accurately reported the savings estimates, value-for-money information and results of its assessment ratings processes.

But DTF’s advice did not consistently show where evidence was weak, incomplete or contested. It did not explain:

• when it relied on default ratings rather than a standard outcomes assessment
• clearinghouse limitations
• unresolved modelling risks.

Default assessment ratings

DTF uses default assessment ratings when it cannot do a standard outcomes assessment. This happens when the government adds initiatives into the EIIF late in the Budget process.

In these cases, DTF can apply a default 'medium' rating to avoid using a 'low' rating, instead of completing a standard assessment. 

Of the 16 initiative assessments we reviewed, DTF communicated an assessment rating to the government for 10 of these initiatives. 

In 3 of these 10 cases, DTF reported a default medium rating for initiatives added to the EIIF late in the Budget process. This is despite it either assessing the initiative as low, or not completing a standard assessment, as Figure 4 shows. 

This approach can result in advice that does not fully reflect DTF’s underlying assessment or the absence of an assessment.

Figure 4: How default 'medium' ratings can misrepresent evidence

Source: VAGO, based on information from DTF.

Outcomes assessment ratings are a key part of DTF’s advice to the government. When DTF applies default ratings without explanation, the government cannot clearly see where evidence is limited or missing.

As a result, the government could approve EIIF initiatives and apply budget reductions without a clear view of the limitations of the supporting evidence or the risks it is accepting.

Clearinghouse supports engagement 

DTF has set up a clearinghouse process that allows departments to review other departments’ proposed EIIF initiatives, including their estimated savings, and raise concerns before DTF provides advice to the government.

DTF runs several clearinghouse rounds each year. It ran 4 in 2025–26.

Clearinghouse limitations

There are limitations in how the clearinghouse currently operates, which reduce its effectiveness in testing initiatives’ estimated savings. We also found gaps in how DTF advises the government on unresolved clearinghouse issues.

Initiatives can be available in the clearinghouse for only a short period, which may limit how well departments can test an initiative’s impact on their budgets. 

DTF’s guidance describes the clearinghouse as a 2-week review process. But it does not set a minimum review period. It also relies on departments to submit their estimated savings on time, which does not always happen. 

Some initiatives do not enter the clearinghouse at all. 

In our review of 16 initiatives submitted to DTF, none met the 2-week period. Instead:

• 5 initiatives (31.3 per cent) did not enter the clearinghouse. In 3 of those cases, DTF developed the estimated savings during Budget discussions, so departments could not review them
• 11 initiatives (68.8 per cent) spent an average of 8 days in the clearinghouse, with review periods ranging from one to 12 days. 

DTF expects departments to make genuine efforts to resolve issues. In 2024–25 and 2025–26, departments resolved 63 of 115 queries (54.8 per cent) through the clearinghouse, across 39 initiatives. This includes 49 resolved queries related to estimated savings. 

As a result, departments revised savings estimates for 19 initiatives. But material issues can remain unresolved within the available time, as Case study 1 shows.

As part of its advice to the government, DTF considers clearinghouse feedback to inform its view on departments' estimated savings modelling. 

But DTF's advice does not report unresolved clearinghouse issues or explain their potential impact on funding decisions. As a result, the government may not have full visibility of uncertain or contested savings estimates when making these decisions.

Unresolved modelling risks 

Departments' modelling of estimated savings may not always reflect system-wide savings. 

DTF guidance notes key modelling risks, which Figure 5 shows.

Figure 5: Key modelling risks and their impacts

Source: VAGO.

DTF does not require departments to test these issues when they calculate their initiatives’ estimated savings. This means that the estimated savings may not fully reflect initiatives’ system wide impacts and may overstate any reduction in service demand. 

For example, DTF guidance tells departments to exclude substitution effects from their estimated savings. This allows departments to show lower demand in one service without recognising higher demand elsewhere.

DTF does not require departments to test for double counting or overlapping cohorts, or adjust estimates where these occur. Departments must identify and resolve these issues themselves. This is often done through the clearinghouse. But issues may remain unresolved and are not currently reported in DTF's advice to the government.

This means savings estimates can reach the government without clear evidence that they represent system-wide savings.

DTF's shadow modelling

DTF uses shadow modelling to test departments’ savings estimates where risks are higher, such as when they are high value, uncertain, contested, or create significant estimated savings for other departments. 

Shadow modelling helps DTF to test departments’ assumptions, evidence and impacts before it advises the government. It also allows DTF to focus its effort where risk is highest.

But DTF does not consistently document how it applies shadow modelling. Records do not always show:

• why it used or did not use shadow modelling
• what risks it found
• what testing it did
• how it resolved differences between its testing and departmental estimates
• any impacts on its funding advice.

Of the 16 EIIF initiatives we reviewed, DTF told us it considered shadow modelling for 6 initiatives and decided it was not needed. 

DTF did not document the reasons why it made these decisions or any tests it performed. This reduces transparency over how DTF has tested higher-risk estimates and the extent to which these tests have informed its advice to the government. 

DTF acknowledged it could better document how it makes decisions about shadow modelling.

Late-entry initiatives

DTF provides funding advice on initiatives that the government includes in the EIIF late in the Budget process. 

At this stage, DTF has limited opportunity to engage with departments before preparing its advice. This leaves little or no time for departments to develop outcome measures, baselines, targets and savings estimates. 

This means late-entry initiatives can go ahead with incomplete evidence, as Case study 2 shows.

In 2024–25, DTF presented 27 initiatives for consideration under the EIIF, including 11 initiatives that the government added late in the process. At the time DTF gave its advice:

• 2 of these initiatives did not have savings estimates
• 7 did not have an outcomes assessment. 

DTF advised the government that these gaps would be addressed after Budget decisions.

These gaps were not evident in 2025–26, when DTF's consolidated brief to the government did not show equivalent evidence gaps.

DTF told us that in 2024–25, it assessed each initiative and identified if late-entry initiatives could meet the EIIF’s objectives. Because of timing constraints, it also said that it would finalise outcome measures, baselines and targets with departments ahead of annual reporting for that year. This reflects the practical limits of developing EIIF specific evidence late in the Budget process.

But DTF guidance does not clearly explain how:

• departments should address evidence gaps, particularly if developing outcome measures or savings estimates is difficult
• it advises the government about funding implications if evidence gaps remain over time.

This means the government may fund some EIIF initiatives without a complete view of whether they meet EIIF requirements, particularly their expected impacts on service demand and savings.

No clear definition of early intervention 

DTF guidance distinguishes the EIIF from standard Budget bids through process requirements, rather than a clear definition of early intervention. 

Instead of applying a consistent definition, DTF and departments assess whether initiatives align with the EIIF based on whether they: 

• meet the EIIF’s requirements to include outcome measures and savings estimates
• respond to illustrative examples and prompting questions about initiatives in DTF’s guidance
• reflect departments’ judgement about whether an initiative represents early intervention.

This means that initiatives can meet EIIF process requirements, but vary significantly in how they intervene early or how directly they link to reducing future service demand. 

For example, some DFFH family violence initiatives funded through EIIF support people through crisis response, like case management and supported emergency accommodation. Their outcome measures focus on immediate response, like the time taken to reach safety and reductions in incidents after the intervention. 

While this may satisfy EIIF process requirements, it is not always clear if these initiatives align with a preventative or early-intervention approach focused on reducing future service demand. 

Without clearer guidance or a shared definition of early intervention, there may be uncertainty about what type of initiatives departments should identify as suitable for the EIIF. This can reduce consistency in initiative design and alignment with the EIIF’s requirements, including its goal of reducing long-term spending on acute services.

Outcomes reporting improves over time

DTF’s annual outcomes report gives the government useful information about initiatives’ performance and their emerging impacts. 

Departments report against their initiatives’ outcome measures. The quality of this information improves as initiatives mature. It can take time for departments to start delivering initiatives and collecting outcomes data. 

As Figure 6 shows, outcome result reporting rates improve from 45.6 per cent in year one of an initiative to 89.5 per cent by year 4, as data for long-term measures becomes available.

Figure 6: Combined outcome measure result reporting by initiative reporting year

Note: Only includes audited departments.
Source: VAGO, based on DTF’s annual outcomes reports.

In 2024–25, our audited departments had targets and results for 214 outcome measures. Departments met the targets for 181 of these measures (84.6 per cent). This shows that, where data is reported, many initiatives are performing as expected.

Outcomes reporting is evidence-based

Departments’ reported results are generally supported by underlying data, which strengthens confidence in the information used for DTF oversight and government decision-making.

Using outcomes reporting to assess performance

DTF has a consistent process to assess departments’ EIIF initiative outcomes reporting and advise the government on whether initiatives are working as intended. 

This strengthens evidence based decision making by helping the government identify: 

• initiatives that are performing well
• emerging risks
• areas where evidence is still developing.

But the conclusions that DTF and the government can draw from this assessment are limited by gaps in reported results, targets, and baselines. 

While DTF uses outcomes reporting to inform its advice to the government, these gaps mean the government cannot rely on this information to: 

• provide a complete picture of reduced service demand
• reassess budget reductions based on changes in service use. 

Gaps in outcomes reporting

Gaps in results, baselines and targets mean that the government does not have a complete view of whether initiatives are improving outcomes and reducing service demand in line with the EIIF’s goals.

Across 4 reporting cycles, our audited departments have reported results for 458 of 811 outcome measures (56.5 per cent), as Figure 7 shows. 

There are often valid reasons for non-reporting. Of the 353 outcome measures without results:

• 108 (30.6 per cent) tracked long-term outcomes that departments cannot measure every year
• 74 (21.0 per cent) related to implementation delays that prevented outcome measurement.

But departments also gave other reasons, such as data collection or process delays, for 171 measures without results (48.4 per cent), which is 21.1 per cent of all 811 outcome measures. This reduces the completeness of evidence available for oversight and comparison across initiatives.

Figure 7: Number and proportion of outcome measure results reported by status and reason

Note: Only includes audited departments. Some totals do not add up to 100 due to rounding.
Source: VAGO, based on DTF’s annual outcomes reports

When departments report outcome results, they do not always reflect complete information. For example, in the 'Specialist forensic mental health services' initiative, DH told us it used health and justice data, but that it could not identify all the initiatives’ participants. 

This means its reported outcome results only cover 25.7 per cent of the initiatives’ target group, limiting how confidently the government can interpret results or assess changes in service demand for this cohort.

DTF and departments also use qualitative updates, such as implementation reports, to report on initiatives’ progress. This information is useful, particularly on an individual initiative level. But it does not replace complete and consistent outcome results or help to measure initiatives’ impact on service demand. This also limits its usefulness for assessing the overall achievements of the EIIF as a framework.

Gaps in baseline reporting

Baselines show ‘as-is’ conditions before an initiative starts and are essential for measuring changes over time. Without baselines, departments and the government cannot reliably interpret reported outcomes.

Across 4 reporting cycles, our audited departments reported baselines for 375 of 811 outcome measures (46.2 per cent). As Figure 8 shows, departments’ baseline reporting was steady between 2021–22 and 2023–24, but fell in 2024–25.

Figure 8: Outcome measure baseline reporting by annual outcomes report year 

Note: Only includes audited departments.
Source: VAGO, based on DTF’s annual outcomes reports.

The decrease in 2024–25 aligns with DTF updating its definition of a baseline. Earlier DTF guidance required departments to include baselines in their reporting, but it did not define them clearly and allowed departments to use historical or representative data. 

From 2024–25, DTF required baselines to show outcomes without the initiative. If departments cannot do this, they appropriately report baselines as ‘not applicable’. 

As a result, some: 

• new initiatives could not set baselines
• existing initiatives withdrew previously reported baselines that no longer met the definition and reported these as not applicable.

We reviewed a selection of 16 initiatives and 73 related outcome measures reported in 2024–25. Departments did not report baselines for 48 outcome measures (65.8 per cent).

Of these, departments told us they did not report baselines for 38 measures (79.2 per cent) because they could not align with DTF's updated baseline definition.

Fewer reported baselines reduce departments and DTF’s ability to measure changes over time. This means reported results cannot always help to inform DTF and the government’s current and future assessments of initiatives and department funding.

Gaps in target reporting

Targets show if initiatives are performing as expected. They help DTF and the government interpret reported results and understand if outcomes show meaningful change over time.

Across 4 reporting cycles, audited departments reported targets for 526 of 811 outcome measures (64.9 per cent). Target reporting generally improves as initiatives mature, as Figure 9 shows.

Figure 9: Combined outcome measure target reporting by initiative reporting year

Note: Only includes audited departments.
Source: VAGO, based on DTF’s annual outcomes reports.

Despite improvements over time, missing targets can still limit DTF’s ability to assess initiatives’ performance consistently across the EIIF. 

In our review of 16 initiatives and 73 related outcome measures reported to DTF in 2024–25, departments did not report targets for 28 outcome measures (38.4 per cent).

Some of these reasons reflect real measurement challenges, especially for complex or long-term outcomes where targets may not apply every year. 

But where targets are not set, it is harder for DTF and the government to assess if reported outcomes show progress towards reducing service demand as intended. This means they have a limited view of the EIIF’s effectiveness.

Reporting challenges for universal initiatives

Some evidence gaps reflect the design of EIIF initiatives, rather than shortcomings in delivery or effort by departments.

Targeted initiatives with clearly defined participants make it easier to compare outcomes before and after an intervention. 

But universal or system wide initiatives apply to whole populations and individual participants cannot be identified. This means departments cannot easily establish what would have happened without the initiative or compare against other cohorts.

For example, the ’Respectful Relationships for children and youth’ initiative aims to reach all students. DE cannot measure what would happen without the initiative, even though DTF’s guidance says this comparison is key to baseline setting.

As a result, outcomes reporting for universal initiatives often focuses on participation or delivery activity, rather than changes in demand for other services.

While this information is valuable for monitoring implementation, it does not provide evidence of long term impact or reduced service use. This means it is not always clear how these initiatives contribute to the EIIF’s goal of reducing service demand and costs over time.

Guidance gaps contribute to incomplete evidence

DTF’s guidance does not always help departments set baselines to show reductions in service demand, including for existing, universal or system wide initiatives. 

DTF defines a baseline as what would happen without the initiative. But when departments cannot set such a baseline, DTF guidance does not clearly set out how they could:

• use proxy cohorts to assess changes in demand 
• use population level data to test their savings assumptions
• reflect uncertainty in their reporting where they cannot directly measure demand reduction.

DTF’s 2026–27 guidance acknowledges that baselines may not always be possible and suggests that departments use external data to build comparisons. Clearer examples in the guidance would improve consistency and strengthen evidence when departments cannot set baselines.

Without clearer guidance, departments often use other measures, such as service uptake or delivery milestones. These measures track how well an initiative is being delivered, but do not show if they improve outcomes or reduce service demand, as Case study 3 shows. 

Some departments use internal tools to establish baselines or negotiate changes with DTF. This helps initiatives to progress, but makes it harder for the government to compare initiatives and assess EIIF initiatives’ performance overall.

DTF’s annual outcomes report also recognises that more detailed data analysis (through program evaluations) can provide deeper insight into service demand and system-level impacts. But this approach is not yet applied consistently across EIIF initiatives and is not integrated into routine reporting.

Lagged data and alternative reporting approaches

As EIIF initiatives mature and reporting improves, data related challenges still affect the consistency and comparability of reported results across initiatives and over time.

Departments often rely on data that lags behind the reporting year. While this can be unavoidable, inconsistent use of lagged data reduces the relevance and comparability of reported results. 

DTF guidance requires departments to report lagged data in the year they collect it, not the year the data refers to. But we found examples of departments not doing this:

• DFFH reported lagged data for its ’Tackling rough sleeping’ initiative and updated earlier results when new data became available. 
• DJCS reported the same data for its ’Women's custodial health services’ initiative across multiple years because the data was collected through a survey that is completed only once every 2 years.

If departments cannot report outcome measure results or targets, they sometimes use proxy measures, interim tracking or related outcome measures to understand performance. These approaches can support internal management. But they do not: 

• meet the EIIF’s reporting requirements
• show changes in service demand
• support the calculation of actual savings.

Inconsistent reporting practices makes it harder for DTF and the government to compare initiative performance or assess if they are delivering their expected outcomes and savings.

Difficulties maintaining baselines and targets

Even where departments set baselines and targets, they cannot always report them consistently over time. Changes to data systems, measurement methods or external conditions can break year to-year comparison.

For example, changes to the National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy measurement scale in 2023 meant that DE could no longer use its previously reported baselines. 

DE instead set up new measures aligned to the revised measurement scale, which could not have baselines that aligned with DTF's definition.

Departments said that participant groups can change for reasons outside their control, including population shifts or broader service system trends. If targets are set against a moving baseline, it becomes harder to see if changes are caused by an initiative’s performance or external factors.

To reflect uncertainty, some departments use ranges in their reporting. In 2024–25, DTF updated its reporting templates and required departments to use single values. This change makes it difficult for departments to compare results over time. Departments manage these issues through explanatory notes or by revising their outcome measures.

But even where departments report outcomes, these issues mean that baselines and targets do not always provide a reliable basis for assessing performance over time, including reductions in service demand or progress towards expected savings.

Public reporting supports transparency

Over recent budgets, the government has increased the amount of information publicly reported on EIIF initiatives through Budget papers.

Budget Paper 3 now includes information for each newly funded EIIF initiative. It includes: 

• initiative objectives
• total funding
• estimated financial and economic benefits
• key impact areas
• expected participant cohort size. 

These changes have improved transparency about what EIIF initiatives aim to achieve and the benefits they are expected to deliver. 

But departments and DTF’s annual outcomes reporting is not public. This limits visibility of whether initiatives are delivering outcomes and reducing service demand in practice. It also limits transparency about the performance and impact of the EIIF as a whole, including whether it is achieving its intended outcomes and reducing service demand across the system.

As the EIIF progresses, public reporting of outcomes would help increase transparency and show whether funding decisions and associated budget reductions are supported by evidence of performance.