Our review followed 2 lines of inquiry:
1. Does the government pay its private sector suppliers according to contracted or otherwise agreed payment terms?
2. Is the data agencies provide to the Department of Jobs, Skills, Industry and Regions (DJSIR), and published by the Victorian Small Business Commission (VSBC) about their invoices, timeframes and compliance rates reliable and do entities fairly present performance publicly?
Download a PDF copy of Appendix C: Audit scope and method.
Download a PDF copy of Appendix B: Abbreviations, acronyms and glossary.
Download a PDF copy of Appendix A: Submissions and comments.
DTP ran a comprehensive market research process to help the government understand options for a new ticketing system. Its tendering process also helped to achieve the government's cost and functionality objectives.
But DTP did not follow government guidelines to appoint an independent probity auditor for the project. Independent probity auditors give assurance that a project’s tender process and outcome comply with legal, regulatory and ethical standards.
Covered in this section:
DTP's benefit management plan for the project is not fully developed. It does not demonstrate value for money and uses some anecdotal data to forecast the project’s expected benefits.
The project’s total cost of ownership is estimated at $2.8 billion over 15 years. The cost of fare collection is estimated at 26 cents per dollar collected.
Overall, value for money for this investment is unclear.
Covered in this section:
DTP is delivering the project to meet its reset timeline. CVTS is now on track installing new reader devices. These devices are supported by thorough testing.
Future delivery stages will be more complex, including the processes and technology needed to verify concession fares.
DTP is responsible for delivering several parts of the project that are outside of CVTS’s scope. DTP has not started planning in detail for future project phases, so it is unclear how it will deliver this work and manage risks.
Covered in this section:
Before it awarded the contract to CVTS, DTP was aware of several project risks. This included the project’s delivery schedule, subcontracting agreements and availability of some original myki software. But DTP did not address these risks before signing the contract.
DTP and CVTS could not resolve issues in a collaborative manner, which led to a 6-month contract standstill period. The negotiations in this period resulted in a project reset, which extended the project’s timeline by 18 months and increased costs by $136.8 million.
Covered in this section:
We made 6 recommendations to address our findings. The relevant agencies have accepted the recommendations in full, in part or in principle.
Our audit followed 3 lines of enquiry:
1. Was the government an informed buyer for the new ticketing approach?
2. Did the tender process for the modernised myki ticketing system support achievement of a value-for-money outcome?
3. Is the rollout of the modernised myki ticketing system being managed effectively?
To answer these questions, we examined 9 entities: